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PLEADING STATUTE OF FRAUDS
IN PENNSYLVANIA

The factual situation in the recent case of Leonard v. Martling,' so far as is
pertinent for this discussion, was substantially as follows:
Plaintiff John J. Leonard, a dentist, brought an action in assumpsit to recover
for professional services rendered to defendant Gerald E. Martling. In this same
action the plaintiff joined Harvey B. Martling as co-defendant, averring that the
latter, "orally guaranteed Plaintiff that he would pay any charges the Defendant
Gerald E. Martling might incur by reason of the said services."
The defendant Harvey B. Martling denied making the guarantee either oral
or in writing but failed to raise the defense of statute of frauds. Subsequently at
trial defendant Harvey B. Martling made a motion for judgment on the pleadings
in the nature of a demurrer contending that plaintiff's allegations predicated liability on an oral guarantee for the debt of another. The trial court dismissed the
motion contending that defendant, having failed to raise the defense of
statute of frauds as provided in The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
1030, had waived this defense. Defendant appealed from this ruling.
The superior court, reversing the trial court, held that since the complaint
failed to allege facts showing circumstances removing the promise from the operation of the statute of frauds, it failed to state a cause of action on which relief
could be granted and thus defendant was excused under Pa. R.C.P. Rule 1032
from the limitations of Pa. R.C.P. Rule 1030.
It is not the purpose of this note to make an extensive analysis of the various
underlying legal theories expounded by the courts since the enactment of the original English Statute of Frauds, 2 nor the fundamental faults which inhere in each
theory 8 since "(t)he search for a logically consistent theory of universal application ends in confusion." 4 It is believed it will suffice to examine the approach the
Pennsylvania courts have taken with respect to pleading the statute of frauds in
the light of present rules of civil procedure.
Under section 16 of the PracticeAct of 19155 it was provided that "(n)either
party shall be permitted at the trial to make any defense which is not set forth in
the affidavit of defense, or plaintiff's reply, as the case may be .. " While the
statute was effective in requiring most defenses to be raised at the pleading stage,
if they were to be raised at all, this was not wholly true of the defense of statute
of frauds. The Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that the Practice Act of
1915 did not limit the availability of this defense to a special plea in certain in1 174 Pa. Sup. 206, 100 A.2d 484 (1953).
2 29 Car. II, c. 3.
3 For a brief discussion of the various theories, see, The Statute Of Frauds: Evaluation of Underlying Theories, 14 Corn. L. Q. 102 (1928) ; see also, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 632 (1926).
4 Ibid., 14 Cornell L. Q. 102, 107.
5 Act of 1915, May 14, P.L. 483, 12 P.S. 452.
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stances. 6 The rationale of the cases allowing the statute of frauds to be raised
other than by special plea is based on the particular wording of the statute raised
as a defense. It is herein that the distinction lies: where a statute uses such language
as "no action shall be brought"'' or that the contract "shall not be enforceable
by action" it is interpreted by the court to mean that the legislature provided "not
mere rules of evidence, but limitations on the judiciary to afford a remedy;" i.e.,
unless the plaintiff pleaded satifaction of the statute, he failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief could be granted 9 and thus allowed the defendant to
raise the defense of statute of frauds at the pleading stage, 10 by motion during the
trial," after verdict,' 2 or even by the court on its own motion. 18 Typical of the
decisions is the following quotation from Sferra v. Urling" by Mr. Chief Justice
Kephart:
"The reason for the rule (is) se-tion 4 of the Sales Act expressly
provides that contracts within its inhibition shall be 'unenforceable,' and
therefore constitutes a 'limitation on the power of the judiciary to afford
a remedy,' as distinguished from a 'mere rule of evidence. Since all
remedy for the enforcement of the contract was taken away, it was wholly
outlawed by section 4, which could not be treated as a personal defense 1 5

6 Brown v. Sheaffer, 93 Pa. Sup. 246 (1928); American Products Company v. Franklin Quality
Refining Company, 275 Pa. 332, 119 A. 414 (1923) ; Sferra v. Urling, 328 Pa. 161, 195 A. 422
(1937); Bayard v. Pennsylvania Knitting Mills Corps., 290 Pa. 79, 137 A. 910 (1927).
7t See, Act of 1855, April 26, P.L. 308, § 1, 33 P.S. 3, (promise to answer for the debt or default of another).
8 See, Act of 1915, May 19, P.L. 543, § 4, 69 P.S. 42, (contract for the sale of goods or choses
in action of the value of $500 or more). Since the language in both statutes has been regarded as
equivalent in the instance case, discussion of cases dealing with each will necessarily have pertinence.
0 This, however, was not true under the common law, altho the statute of frauds under section
4 of the Uniform Sales Act is, in substance, practically the same as the original English Statute of
Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, § 17. "When the contract is in writing, it is not necessary to state
that circumstance in a declaration. And even in cases where, by the statute of frauds, the promise
is rendered ineffectual, unless there be a memorandum of its terms in writing, it is not necessary
in a declaration at law, or in a bill in equity, to show that the requisition of the statute has been
complied with in this respect. . . it should seem that the provisions of the statute only affects the
rules of evidence and not those of pleading." I Chiddy, Pleading, p. 303 (1851). See also, n. 16,
infra.
10 Mason-Heflin Coal Company v. Currie, 270 Pa. 221, 113 A. 202 (1921); Vitro Manufacturing Company v. Standard Chemical Company, 291 Pa. 85, 139 A. 615 (1927).
11 Martin v. Wilson, 371 Pa. 529, 92 A.2d 193 (1952). It has always been the rule that failure
to state a cause of action can be raised at the trial.
12 Brown v. Sheaffer, n. 6, supra.
1s In Sferra v. Urling, n. 6, supra, the court suggests that the statute of frauds could be applied
by the trial court despite the fact that it was not called to the court's attention in any manner.
Contra, Allison v. Steele, 220 N.C. 318, 17 S.E.2d 339, (1953), (Sales Act). To the effect
that it is not the province of the court to act on its own volition.
14 N. 6, supra., where Chief Justice Kephart gives extensive treatment to this topic.
15 "Facts. . . necessary to take the case out of the statute must be averred. . . in order to show a
recovery may be had under the statute (Sales Act, Sec. 4).", Mason-Heflin Coal Company v. Currie,
n. 10, supra.
For an analogous situation relating to the statute of limitations, and a review of statutes requiring an action to be brought within a limited period of time, see, Swartz v. Great American Insurance Company, 78 Pa. D. & C. 376 (1953),
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To the same effect under the statute of frauds dealing with a promise to pay
the debt of another:
"The authorities in other jurisdictions are in conflict as to the necessity of specially pleading the want of proper writing to support the
guaranty of the debt of another. In some, the defense has been held to
be personal; which the defendant may or may not take advantage of,
as in the case of statute of limitations. In Pennsylvania this has not been
declared, but it has been held that judgment should be entered for the
defendant where the evidence shows the contract not to be legally sustainable." 1 6
However, where the statute of frauds does not contain such words as noted
above, or words of similar import, it is not controlled by a legislative mandate; and
it is to these that the procedural limitation properly applies. Where the court had
before it the statute of frauds relating to the sale of land, 17 the court points out
that it "merely says oral leases of more than three years shall have the effect of
tenancies at will" and does not deprive such leases "entirely of legal effect; 18
therefore, failure to timely assert the defense constituted a waiver.
This then brings us to the principal case and the Pa. R.C.P. of 1947.19 The
court unquestionably indicates that the new rules of civil procedure will not change
the position df the courts with respect to pleading satisfaction of the statute of
frauds in those cases where the statute is in the nature of a substantive mandate.
Rule 103020 provides, "The defense of . . . statute of frauds . . . shall be
pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading 'New Matter.'" (Emphasis
supplied); and Rule 1032 providing in part, "a party waives all defenses and objections which he does not present either by preliminary objection, answer or reply, except.. . failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Relying upon the foregoing rules, the trial court ruled that the
defendant, having failed to interpose the defense of statute of frauds according
to Rule 1030, lost his opportunity to subsequently rely on this defense. However,
the defendant argued that because the plaintiff failed to allege satisfaction of the
statute of frauds, he failed to state a cause df action and thus defendant was governed by the exception under Rule 1032.

16 Bayard v. Pennsylvania Knitting Mills Corp., n. 6, supra.
But this was not the view under the common law. "So, in the case of a promise to answer
for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, which was good by parol, at common law,
but, by the statute of frauds, is not valid unless the agreement, or some memorandum or note
thereof, be in writing, and signed by the party, etc., the declaration on such promise need not
allege a written contract." Shipman, Common Law Pleading (3rd ed.), § 307, p. 507 (1923).
Nor is this the view in the majority of American jurisdictions, see, II Williston, Contracts, § 527.
17 Act of 1772, March 21, 1 Sm. L. 389, 33 P.S. I.
18 Sferra v. Urling, n. 6, supra.
19 Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 P.S. Appendix.
20 Ibid.. p. 394.
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It is apparent the ultimate determination resolves itself in whether or not the
plaintiff, by alleging an oral contract, 2 ' failed to state a cause of action so as to
allow defendant to interpose the defense otherwise than by preliminary objection, answer or reply.2 2 The court, relying on the wealth of authority under the
PracticeAct of 1915, reversed the lower court:
"Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to 'state a claim upon which relief
can be granted' and the d'efendant's failure to plead the statute of frauds
was excused by Pa. R.C.P. No. 1032."
"A statute of frauds, such as the one in the instant case, which constitutes a substantive rule of law cannot be included in the operation of
rule 1030."
It is important to note that the decision is based again on the interpretation
of the language of the particular statute of frauds relied on as a defense; the
promulgation of new rules of civil procedure did not in any way affect the substantive requirements of the statute.
The court also reviews, and cites with approval, the previous decisions discussed herein relating to the statute of frauds under the Sales Act, and contracts
for the sale of realty:
"The statutes of frauds required to be pleaded by Pa. R.C.P. No.
1030 are... [contracts for the sale of realty], where noncompliance does
not deprive the agreement ,,f legal effect nor limit the power of the judiciary to afford a remedy."
Since the passage of the Uniform Commercial Code23 in Pennsylvania will
supercede the Uniform Sales Act, it requires some comment. It is believed the
statute of frauds section under the Uniform Commercial Code2 4 will not affect
the pleading requitements heretofore discussed under the Sales Act since the language is practically identical: ". . . a contract... is not enforceable by way of action
or defense .. " (Emphasis supplied.)
Adam B. Krafczek
Member of the Middler Class

21 Or, under the Uniform Sales Act, failure to show satisfaction of the statute of frauds by part
performance. But where plaintiff had alleged facts constituting part performance, he was not
within the purview of the statute and thus defendant, having failed to interpose his defense at the
proper time, had waived his defense, Martin v. Wilson, n. 11, supra.
22 Rule 1032 (1) provides that the legal sufficiency of the complaint may be attacked either by
preliminary objection, answer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or by motion at the trial on
the merits.
, 1"28 Act of 1953, April 6, P.L. 1 Act No. 1 (Effective date, July 1, 1954).
24 Ibid., § 2-201.

